View Poll Results: >Can GM be the next Chrysler ?
Yes, if they don't get it together 4-Sure
2
50.00%
No Way that can happen
0
0%
I just don't know > I get so confused sometimes > all the time <
1
25.00%
Maybe ?
1
25.00%
Voters: 4. You may not vote on this poll
?>Can GM Be the Next Chrysler?<?
?>Can GM Be the Next Chrysler?<?
Can GM Be the Next Chrysler?
MCF Member's, What do you think ? Post & let us know ?
By Douglas A. McIntyre November 14, 2014 6:30 am EST
Although General Motors Co. (NYSE: GM) is dogged by news of recalls and deaths
of drivers of its cars, its Cadillac, Buick and Chevrolet brands rate well in one of the most important surveys of car quality. At the other end of the spectrum, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (NYSE: FCAU) models do poorly. Based on the same research, its Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge brands rank well below average.
The J.D. Power Vehicle Dependability Study helps car companies market and sell cars. But GM’s sales in 2014 have been poor, while Chrysler’s have been on fire. In the first 10 months of the year, GM’s sales total was 2,434,707 cars and light trucks, up 3.9%, which is well below the national average for the same period.
Chrysler sales rose 15.3% to 1,726,539. The trend is not new. Chrysler posted better growth results than GM did in 2013, before news about GM’s recalls broke in the media.
GM’s problem is evident looking at its numbers. None of its main brands posted impressive sales through the first 10 months of the year. Its largest brand, Chevrolet, had an increase of 2.2% to 1.19 million. Sales at Buick were up only 4.0% to 189,000. And Cadillac sales fell 4.4% to 189,000. The only GM brand that did fairly well was its GMC truck division, which had a sales increase of 8.0% to 405,000.
Chrysler’s success is based almost entirely on trucks and SUVs. It has no luxury division. In light of the sales failures of GM’s Cadillac and Ford Motor Co.’s (NYSE: F) Lincoln, the decision by Chrysler to avoid the luxury segment, crowded by German brands, seems smart.
Sales of Chrysler’s Jeep line rose 46% in the first 10 months of the year to 571,585, based mostly on the success of its new Cherokee. Ram pickup sales over the same period rose 26% to 379,647. The primary reason was the success of its flagship heavy-duty vehicle. The success of the two brands more than offset the fact that Chrysler has had trouble selling its two car brands. Through the first 10 months, sales of the Chrysler division dropped 4% to 250,612. Sales of Dodge cars were off 4% to 485,469.
If there is a lesson to Chrysler’s success and GM’s mediocre performance, it is not consumer quality perception. Chrysler has created two brands that customers flock to. GM has created none.
ALSO READ: 10 Brands That Will Disappear in 2015 < ? Your Choice
MCF Member's, What do you think ? Post & let us know ?
By Douglas A. McIntyre November 14, 2014 6:30 am EST
Although General Motors Co. (NYSE: GM) is dogged by news of recalls and deaths
of drivers of its cars, its Cadillac, Buick and Chevrolet brands rate well in one of the most important surveys of car quality. At the other end of the spectrum, Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. (NYSE: FCAU) models do poorly. Based on the same research, its Chrysler, Jeep and Dodge brands rank well below average.The J.D. Power Vehicle Dependability Study helps car companies market and sell cars. But GM’s sales in 2014 have been poor, while Chrysler’s have been on fire. In the first 10 months of the year, GM’s sales total was 2,434,707 cars and light trucks, up 3.9%, which is well below the national average for the same period.
Chrysler sales rose 15.3% to 1,726,539. The trend is not new. Chrysler posted better growth results than GM did in 2013, before news about GM’s recalls broke in the media.
GM’s problem is evident looking at its numbers. None of its main brands posted impressive sales through the first 10 months of the year. Its largest brand, Chevrolet, had an increase of 2.2% to 1.19 million. Sales at Buick were up only 4.0% to 189,000. And Cadillac sales fell 4.4% to 189,000. The only GM brand that did fairly well was its GMC truck division, which had a sales increase of 8.0% to 405,000.
Chrysler’s success is based almost entirely on trucks and SUVs. It has no luxury division. In light of the sales failures of GM’s Cadillac and Ford Motor Co.’s (NYSE: F) Lincoln, the decision by Chrysler to avoid the luxury segment, crowded by German brands, seems smart.
Sales of Chrysler’s Jeep line rose 46% in the first 10 months of the year to 571,585, based mostly on the success of its new Cherokee. Ram pickup sales over the same period rose 26% to 379,647. The primary reason was the success of its flagship heavy-duty vehicle. The success of the two brands more than offset the fact that Chrysler has had trouble selling its two car brands. Through the first 10 months, sales of the Chrysler division dropped 4% to 250,612. Sales of Dodge cars were off 4% to 485,469.
If there is a lesson to Chrysler’s success and GM’s mediocre performance, it is not consumer quality perception. Chrysler has created two brands that customers flock to. GM has created none.
ALSO READ: 10 Brands That Will Disappear in 2015 < ? Your Choice
>New York Times November 2014
A Fatally Flawed Switch, and a Burdened G.M. Engineer
By BILL VLASICNOVNov. 13, 2014
DETROIT — Raymond DeGiorgio was just another obscure engineer atGeneral Motors — until the company blamed him for starting the worst safety crisis in its history.
But even after being identified as the employee who approved a deadly defect in millions of cars, Mr. DeGiorgio has remained an enigmatic figure at the heart of G.M.’s recall scandal.
G.M. dismissed him in June, and he went into seclusion, refusing interviews. When questioned by House investigators and company lawyers, he repeatedly said he could not recall events or interactions with co-workers.
That wall of silence finally cracked recently outside his home in suburban Detroit.
Asked about the dozens of people who were killed and injured because of a faulty ignition switch that he was responsible for, Mr. DeGiorgio, 61, broke down and cried.
“It’s very emotional,” he said. “I’m getting very emotional about it right now.”
Continue reading the main storyRELATED COVERAGE
Continue reading the main storyVideo
PLAY VIDEO|4:12
G.M. Engineer on Switch Defect
G.M. Engineer on Switch Defect
Raymond DeGiorgio, an engineer at General Motors, is at the center of accusations that the company covered up a deadly defect. In these clips from a deposition in April 2013, he answers questions about the faulty ignition switches.
Video by Bill Vlasic on Publish DateMay 29, 2014.
G.M. has offered a litany of reasons for its inability to fix a defective part in its small cars for more than a decade, including a dysfunctional bureaucracy and a toxic culture that shunned accountability.
But it has consistently focused blame on Mr. DeGiorgio, who approved the substandard switch in 2001 and secretly changed it five years later, leaving dangerous vehicles on the road and frustrating efforts within G.M. to investigate the problem.
Most damning was an internal G.M. inquiry by the former federal prosecutor Anton R. Valukas, who said that Mr. DeGiorgio’s errors had “serious consequences” that have now contributed to at least 30 deaths.
Yet interviews with current and former employees and a broad examination of documents turned over to Congress reveal a different account — that of a midlevel engineer who tried to satisfy orders for a smoothly functioning switch that would help G.M. improve the image of its cut-rate small cars.
Documents show that Mr. DeGiorgio was in close contact with a number of other G.M. workers and officials at Delphi, the switch’s supplier, in his attempts to fix the faulty part. And while he had considerable authority, he operated without significant supervision or oversight.
When the switch began failing because the ignition key could be inadvertently bumped, shutting off the engine and disabling airbags, Mr. DeGiorgio tried to have it replaced with a newer part. But his request was rejected by a high-level G.M. product committee, documents show.
He then violated company policy by ordering a modified switch from Delphi without a new part number, according to G.M. While that fixed the problem for future vehicles, it left countless people at risk of driving cars equipped with the original part.
To hear Mr. DeGiorgio tell it, he was nothing more than a loyal worker whose best efforts got him fired and made him a target of possible criminal charges. “I did what I was supposed to do,” he said.
Continue reading the main story
His response is revealing for what current and former employees say is the culture inside G.M.’s sprawling technical center in Warren, Mich., where thousands of engineers and designers work in a vast matrix of offices that one former executive nicknamed “cube city.”
“DeGiorgio was part of what we called the ‘frozen middle’ at G.M., just another tiny cog in a massive machine,” said the executive, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he now works for a major G.M. supplier. “You stay in your box and you do your job. And you don’t let anyone else into your box.”
Mr. DeGiorgio’s job in the spring of 2001 was to choose a switch that would improve the bargain-basement image of G.M.’s small cars.
Senior management dictated that new models like the Cobalt have higher-class, European-style components, interviews reveal. The message was driven home to engineers by a supervisory panel called TALC — the “touch, aroma and look” committee.
Presented with two design options for a Cobalt switch, Mr. DeGiorgio picked the one that required less force to turn the key. But it fared poorly in testing. “Failure is significant,” Mr. DeGiorgio wrote to G.M. co-workers in a previously unreported email. “I just returned from Delphi. They promised modified switches.”
Over the next several months, he expressed his frustration with the weak switch in several emails to G.M. colleagues and Delphi engineers, even calling it the “switch from hell.”
Documents show that Mr. DeGiorgio interacted with a wide range of G.M. departments about the problem, including warranty claim managers, supply chain officials, electrical engineers and test-track drivers.
By mid-2005, internal emails show that Mr. DeGiorgio was being pressed by two product committees to change the switch, and was meeting frequently with Delphi engineers for a solution.
“Cobalt is blowing up in their face,” one Delphi official wrote to a co-worker in June 2005.
Continue reading the main storyINTERACTIVE FEATURE
G.M. Recalls: Crisis in Auto Safety
The New York Times has exposed missteps and delays by automakers and federal safety regulators in responding to deadly defects in automobiles during what has become a record year for recalls — more than 53 million in the United States alone through October.
OPEN INTERACTIVE FEATURE
In September 2005, Mr. DeGiorgio asked a high-level engineering committee to replace the switch with a new, stronger part designed for a future G.M. model. The request was rejected, documents show.
Reports of ignition failures continued to pour into G.M., including news media accounts of Cobalts stalling during test drives. In May 2006, Mr. DeGiorgio made a decision. He instructed Delphi, in writing, to replace the switch with a stronger version that he had initially bypassed five years earlier.
But his failure to issue a new part number would torpedo G.M.’s efforts to understand why older Cobalts had much higher failure rates than cars built after 2006.
Mr. DeGiorgio compounded his mistake when he told G.M. product investigators in 2009, and again in 2012, that he had never changed the Cobalt ignition, according to documents.
But a reckoning was coming. Lawyers representing the family of Brooke Melton, a Georgia woman killed in a Cobalt crash, sued G.M. and discovered during independent testing that older Cobalts had different ignition switches than newer ones did.
Continue reading the main story
Continue reading the main story
In his deposition in April 2013, Mr. DeGiorgio denied replacing the faulty switch in 2006. “I don’t recall ever authorizing a change,” he said. But he could not deny the physical evidence presented by the family’s lawyer, Lance Cooper, showing that newer Cobalts were equipped with a stronger switch.
“Do you see the difference?” Mr. Cooper asked.
“Yes,” Mr. DeGiorgio said.
Soon after the deposition, G.M. lawyers quickly sought a confidential settlement in the case. More important, Mr. DeGiorgio’s testimony revived an internal inquiry of the ignition switch that led to the recalls of 2.6 million small cars starting in February, and plunged G.M. into a safety crisis that has cost billions of dollars and smeared its reputation.
Now Mr. DeGiorgio is facing multiple legal threats. He could be criminally prosecuted for withholding safety information from federal regulators and possibly charged with perjury for his deposition.
Lawyers pursuing wrongful-death cases against G.M. are also focusing intently on Mr. DeGiorgio, as well as other company officials who worked with him.
“DeGiorgio was able to both successfully thrive and hide in the weeds of G.M.’s corporate carelessness,” said Robert Hilliard, who represents hundreds of accident victims and their families.
Until now, Mr. DeGiorgio, who worked for G.M. for 23 years, had not spoken publicly about his actions. But on a recent weekday morning, he opened up in a brief conversation.
A short, slightly built man with curly hair and a white mustache, he bristled at accusations he was incompetent and negligent. “My name has been trashed,” he said. “I’ve been crucified in public. What else is left other than jail time? What else?”
He lashed out at news accounts of his career at G.M. “There’s been so much written about me,” he said. “Some of it is just fiction.”
When pressed to explain, Mr. DeGiorgio abruptly cut off the discussion. “I could write a book just about the switch,” he said. “Maybe someday I will.”
But his protests hardly absolve him in the eyes of Laura Christian, the birth mother of Amber Marie Rose, a Maryland teenager who was killed in 2005 behind the wheel of a defective Chevrolet Cobalt.
“He had many opportunities to correct his mistakes or speak out about the defective switches,” Ms. Christian said. “The pain he may be feeling is nothing compared to the pain of losing a child.”
By BILL VLASICNOVNov. 13, 2014
DETROIT — Raymond DeGiorgio was just another obscure engineer atGeneral Motors — until the company blamed him for starting the worst safety crisis in its history.
But even after being identified as the employee who approved a deadly defect in millions of cars, Mr. DeGiorgio has remained an enigmatic figure at the heart of G.M.’s recall scandal.
G.M. dismissed him in June, and he went into seclusion, refusing interviews. When questioned by House investigators and company lawyers, he repeatedly said he could not recall events or interactions with co-workers.
That wall of silence finally cracked recently outside his home in suburban Detroit.
Asked about the dozens of people who were killed and injured because of a faulty ignition switch that he was responsible for, Mr. DeGiorgio, 61, broke down and cried.
“It’s very emotional,” he said. “I’m getting very emotional about it right now.”
Continue reading the main storyRELATED COVERAGE
Continue reading the main storyVideo
PLAY VIDEO|4:12G.M. Engineer on Switch Defect
G.M. Engineer on Switch Defect
Raymond DeGiorgio, an engineer at General Motors, is at the center of accusations that the company covered up a deadly defect. In these clips from a deposition in April 2013, he answers questions about the faulty ignition switches.
Video by Bill Vlasic on Publish DateMay 29, 2014.
G.M. has offered a litany of reasons for its inability to fix a defective part in its small cars for more than a decade, including a dysfunctional bureaucracy and a toxic culture that shunned accountability.
But it has consistently focused blame on Mr. DeGiorgio, who approved the substandard switch in 2001 and secretly changed it five years later, leaving dangerous vehicles on the road and frustrating efforts within G.M. to investigate the problem.
Most damning was an internal G.M. inquiry by the former federal prosecutor Anton R. Valukas, who said that Mr. DeGiorgio’s errors had “serious consequences” that have now contributed to at least 30 deaths.
Yet interviews with current and former employees and a broad examination of documents turned over to Congress reveal a different account — that of a midlevel engineer who tried to satisfy orders for a smoothly functioning switch that would help G.M. improve the image of its cut-rate small cars.
Documents show that Mr. DeGiorgio was in close contact with a number of other G.M. workers and officials at Delphi, the switch’s supplier, in his attempts to fix the faulty part. And while he had considerable authority, he operated without significant supervision or oversight.
When the switch began failing because the ignition key could be inadvertently bumped, shutting off the engine and disabling airbags, Mr. DeGiorgio tried to have it replaced with a newer part. But his request was rejected by a high-level G.M. product committee, documents show.
He then violated company policy by ordering a modified switch from Delphi without a new part number, according to G.M. While that fixed the problem for future vehicles, it left countless people at risk of driving cars equipped with the original part.
To hear Mr. DeGiorgio tell it, he was nothing more than a loyal worker whose best efforts got him fired and made him a target of possible criminal charges. “I did what I was supposed to do,” he said.
Continue reading the main story
His response is revealing for what current and former employees say is the culture inside G.M.’s sprawling technical center in Warren, Mich., where thousands of engineers and designers work in a vast matrix of offices that one former executive nicknamed “cube city.”
“DeGiorgio was part of what we called the ‘frozen middle’ at G.M., just another tiny cog in a massive machine,” said the executive, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he now works for a major G.M. supplier. “You stay in your box and you do your job. And you don’t let anyone else into your box.”
Mr. DeGiorgio’s job in the spring of 2001 was to choose a switch that would improve the bargain-basement image of G.M.’s small cars.
Senior management dictated that new models like the Cobalt have higher-class, European-style components, interviews reveal. The message was driven home to engineers by a supervisory panel called TALC — the “touch, aroma and look” committee.
Presented with two design options for a Cobalt switch, Mr. DeGiorgio picked the one that required less force to turn the key. But it fared poorly in testing. “Failure is significant,” Mr. DeGiorgio wrote to G.M. co-workers in a previously unreported email. “I just returned from Delphi. They promised modified switches.”
Over the next several months, he expressed his frustration with the weak switch in several emails to G.M. colleagues and Delphi engineers, even calling it the “switch from hell.”
Documents show that Mr. DeGiorgio interacted with a wide range of G.M. departments about the problem, including warranty claim managers, supply chain officials, electrical engineers and test-track drivers.
By mid-2005, internal emails show that Mr. DeGiorgio was being pressed by two product committees to change the switch, and was meeting frequently with Delphi engineers for a solution.
“Cobalt is blowing up in their face,” one Delphi official wrote to a co-worker in June 2005.
Continue reading the main storyINTERACTIVE FEATURE
G.M. Recalls: Crisis in Auto Safety
The New York Times has exposed missteps and delays by automakers and federal safety regulators in responding to deadly defects in automobiles during what has become a record year for recalls — more than 53 million in the United States alone through October.
OPEN INTERACTIVE FEATURE
In September 2005, Mr. DeGiorgio asked a high-level engineering committee to replace the switch with a new, stronger part designed for a future G.M. model. The request was rejected, documents show.
Reports of ignition failures continued to pour into G.M., including news media accounts of Cobalts stalling during test drives. In May 2006, Mr. DeGiorgio made a decision. He instructed Delphi, in writing, to replace the switch with a stronger version that he had initially bypassed five years earlier.
But his failure to issue a new part number would torpedo G.M.’s efforts to understand why older Cobalts had much higher failure rates than cars built after 2006.
Mr. DeGiorgio compounded his mistake when he told G.M. product investigators in 2009, and again in 2012, that he had never changed the Cobalt ignition, according to documents.
But a reckoning was coming. Lawyers representing the family of Brooke Melton, a Georgia woman killed in a Cobalt crash, sued G.M. and discovered during independent testing that older Cobalts had different ignition switches than newer ones did.
Continue reading the main story
Continue reading the main story
In his deposition in April 2013, Mr. DeGiorgio denied replacing the faulty switch in 2006. “I don’t recall ever authorizing a change,” he said. But he could not deny the physical evidence presented by the family’s lawyer, Lance Cooper, showing that newer Cobalts were equipped with a stronger switch.
“Do you see the difference?” Mr. Cooper asked.
“Yes,” Mr. DeGiorgio said.
Soon after the deposition, G.M. lawyers quickly sought a confidential settlement in the case. More important, Mr. DeGiorgio’s testimony revived an internal inquiry of the ignition switch that led to the recalls of 2.6 million small cars starting in February, and plunged G.M. into a safety crisis that has cost billions of dollars and smeared its reputation.
Now Mr. DeGiorgio is facing multiple legal threats. He could be criminally prosecuted for withholding safety information from federal regulators and possibly charged with perjury for his deposition.
Lawyers pursuing wrongful-death cases against G.M. are also focusing intently on Mr. DeGiorgio, as well as other company officials who worked with him.
“DeGiorgio was able to both successfully thrive and hide in the weeds of G.M.’s corporate carelessness,” said Robert Hilliard, who represents hundreds of accident victims and their families.
Until now, Mr. DeGiorgio, who worked for G.M. for 23 years, had not spoken publicly about his actions. But on a recent weekday morning, he opened up in a brief conversation.
A short, slightly built man with curly hair and a white mustache, he bristled at accusations he was incompetent and negligent. “My name has been trashed,” he said. “I’ve been crucified in public. What else is left other than jail time? What else?”
He lashed out at news accounts of his career at G.M. “There’s been so much written about me,” he said. “Some of it is just fiction.”
When pressed to explain, Mr. DeGiorgio abruptly cut off the discussion. “I could write a book just about the switch,” he said. “Maybe someday I will.”
But his protests hardly absolve him in the eyes of Laura Christian, the birth mother of Amber Marie Rose, a Maryland teenager who was killed in 2005 behind the wheel of a defective Chevrolet Cobalt.
“He had many opportunities to correct his mistakes or speak out about the defective switches,” Ms. Christian said. “The pain he may be feeling is nothing compared to the pain of losing a child.”
GM's Mary Barra may be “toast” – leadership expert < Click Here
GM and Ford have been battling it out for the hearts and dollars of Americans for more than a century. GM is still winning on pure size - it's the world's third largest automaker
behind Toyota and VW. But as far as leadership goes - one expert says GM may need to start worrying about who they have at the helm.
Yahoo Finance
Last edited by Space; Nov 15, 2014 at 05:03 AM.
>Thanks Tadd for adding your post/opinion 4-Sure
Hi `Tadd,
I can
=================
Oh `God
=================
Oh `God
Last edited by Space; Nov 15, 2014 at 10:37 AM.
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6th Gen ('00-'05): What can I look at next??
jonapp
Engine/Transmission/Performance Adders
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Apr 10, 2013 06:11 PM